Passenger Claims, are they still limited?
ANELE MVUMVU & 2 OTHERS v THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORT & THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND – CASE NO. 7490/2008
The applicants sought a declaration that s 18(1) and (2) of the Road Accident Fund Act (“the Act”) are inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that they limit the claims against the second respondent, the Road Accident Fund (“the Fund”) to a maximum of R25 000.00.
After hearing argument by all parties the court made the following order:
“(1) It is declared that sections 18(1)(a)(i) and 18(1)(b) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, as they stood prior to 1 August 2008, were inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.
(2) It is declared that section 18(2) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, as it stood prior to 1 August 2008, was inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.
(3) Such declarations of invalidity will apply to and govern all claims instituted or to be instituted under the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, which at the date of this order:
(a) have not prescribed; and
(b) have not been finally determined by judgments at first instance or on appeal; and
(c) have not been finally determined by settlement duly concluded.
(4) All such claims referred to in para 3 above shall qualify for no greater compensation than that
which would accrue under the provisions of the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act, 19 of 2005, as it stood on 1 August 2008.
(5) This order is referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation of the order of constitutional invalidity.
(6) The respondents are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the costs of this application, including the costs of the expert witness…”
It would seem that the court tried to limit the financial liability of the Fund by way of the remedial order in par 4 of the order hereinabove by subjecting the claims of the passengers to the limitations in the Amendment Act.
Although the purpose of said paragraph is clear same cannot be said for the consequences thereof and the Applicants attorney has already prepared papers to bring an application to the Constitutional Court to have paragraph 4 set aside.
I will keep you updated of future developments.
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax : 086 616 8308
Now for some words of wisdom –
Seeking wealth for wealth’s sake is vain and evil.
Child support grants – Should they be deducted?
Dear Reader,
Welcome to the thirteenth edition of Independent Actuarial Consultant’s (IAC) monthly newsletter. Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents and the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims.
We will also keep you updated of IAC developments, events and training seminars and lighten up your day with a joke or inspirational quote.
Training
I would like to thank everyone involved with the training sessions in Durban, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth for helping make it a huge success. In all we had 120 people who attended the sessions.
I am very proud to have been able to be a part of same and I look forward to next year.
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v NTOMBIZANELE FLORENCE TIMIS – (29/09) [2010] ZASCA 30 (26 March 2010)
Mr Alfred Vuyisile Makeleni (the deceased) died from injuries sustained after being struck by a motor vehicle on 28 July 2001. He was married to Ms Ntombizanele Timis, the respondent in this matter, in terms of customary law. They had two minor children, namely Siphokazi born on 24 June 1996 and Zandile born on 25 May 1999. The deceased was the sole breadwinner. Shortly after his death, the respondent, who was unemployed, applied for the benefit of her children for a child support grant in terms of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992, which has since been repealed by the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 (the Act). The application was approved during November 2001.
The respondent instituted action for damages arising from the death of her husband. The court awarded the respondent damages and Liebenberg J held that the child support grants could not be said to have been received in consequence of the deceased’s death and that same could therefore not be deducted from the final award.
The RAF appealed and the issue on appeal is whether or not the child support grants should have been deducted by the trial court from the damages awarded to the respondent in her representative capacity for loss of support.
Two conflicting considerations must be weighed up in the light of what is considered to be fair and just in all the circumstances of the case. The one is that a plaintiff should not receive double compensation. The other is that the wrongdoer or his insurer ought not to be relieved of liability on account of some fortuitous event such as the generosity of a third party.
It is not in dispute that the deceased was responsible for the support of his family during his lifetime. The position, however, changed upon his death as his family became indigent. The respondent had to apply for the child care grant as the parent who had provided maintenance had died. The children received a benefit of a social grant because they had lost their father, a breadwinner. The child support grants are therefore directly linked to the death of the deceased.
In this matter, the State assumed responsibility for the support of the children as a result of the breadwinner’s death. The moneys paid out in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act and the Social Assistance Act are funded by the public through two State organs. Not to deduct the child grant would amount to double recovery by the respondent at the expense of the taxpayer and this is incapable of justification. It was not the intention of the Legislature to compensate the dependents twice.
The court a quo accordingly erred in finding that the child support grants should not be deducted. Its order in that regard must be set aside.
The appeal is upheld.
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax : 086 616 8308
Scale of costs – High court or not
Dear Reader,
Welcome to the twelfth edition of Independent Actuarial Consultant’s (IAC) monthly newsletter. Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents and the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims.
We will also keep you updated of IAC developments, events and training seminars and lighten up your day with a joke or inspirational quote.
Training
I am excited to announce that IAC will again be presenting training on the calculation of simple loss of income and loss of support calculations. The training is aimed at attorneys in order to equip them to give better instructions,
have a better understanding of the actuarial calculation process and to aid in settlement of matters.
Same will be taking place on the following dates:
Durban 13 July 2010
Johannesburg 15 July 2010
Pretoria 15 July 2010
Cape Town 28 July 2010
Port Elizabeth 29 July 2010
KINDLY COMPLETE YOUR CONFIRMATION OF ATTENDANCE DOCUMENTS FOR THE CAPE TOWN AND PORT ELIZABETH SESSIONS AND E-MAIL SAME TO roelf.nel@iac.co.za OR FAX TO 011 333 9663 ON/BEFORE 16 JULY 2010.
KINDLY NOTE THAT THERE ARE STILL 16 SPOTS LEFT FOR THE DURBAN SESSION AND 9 SPOTS FOR THE JOHANNESBURG SESSION,
PLEASE PHONE ME ON 083 393 8530 SHOULD YOU BE INTERESTED IN TAKING UP SAME.
TSELE REGINALD KANONO v THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND – 7072/2008 [UNREPORTED] – FREE STATE HC
The Plaintiff instituted action against the Defendant for payment in the amount of R124 919, 24 for damages suffered as a result of motor vehicle accident.
The Plaintiff chose the High Court as appropriate forum to institute proceedings.
The Plaintiff abandoned the whole amount of R100 000 for general damages and subsequently the merits and quantum of damages were settled in the amount of R24 919,24 being special damages. The Defendant tendered party and party costs on Magistrates Court scale and increased advocates fees.
Counsel for the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant never objected to the High Court’s jurisdiction before trial even when Defendant had ample opportunity to do so during the R37 conference. It was also argued that Defendant had sufficient time to settle the matter before the trial date and all the costs could have been prevented.
Counsel for Defendant argued that proper investigation had to be done by Defendant to consider the claim and that Defendant had indeed tried to settle the claim.
From the beginning it was clear that Plaintiff’s claim would be limited.
The court held that the general rule that costs follow the event is subject to the overriding principle that the court has a judicial discretion in awarding costs.
The court further held that the fact that the Plaintiff claimed more than she succeeded in recovering is insufficient ground for refusing her costs or to justify the court in depriving her of costs. The claim must be excessive, or grossly disproportionate to the amount awarded, before that would be done.
Plaintiff’s injuries were described as:
“minor bodily injuries to the head as well as fairly severe injuries to the chest which include laceration
of the left side of the face and fracture of the left ‘scapula’”.
The purpose of an award of cost to a successful party is to indemnify him for the expense to which he has been put by having unjustly been compelled to initiate or defend litigation.
The cost order is not intended to be compensation for a risk to which a litigant has been exposed, but a refund of expenses actually incurred PAYEN COMPONENTS SA LTD v BOVIC GASKETS CC 1999 (2) SA 409 
417. The award of costs is a judicial discretion and must be exercise on grounds upon which a reasonable person could have come to the conclusion arrived at.
After due consideration of the facts the court held that the matter did not “present considerable difficulties in fact or law” as was indicated in the BARNARD v SA MUTUAL FIRE & GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD 1979 (2) SA 1012 ( SE) case.
The Plaintiff had been over optimistic in regard to the amount she claimed as damages.
The court ordered that the cost’s is to be taxed on a scale applicable in the Magistrate’s Court.
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax : 086 616 8308
Contingency fee agreements and their application
Dear Reader,
Welcome to the eleventh edition of Independent Actuarial Consultant’s (IAC) monthly newsletter. Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents and the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims.
We will also keep you updated of IAC developments, events and training seminars and lighten up your day with a joke or inspirational quote.
Training
I am excited to announce that IAC will again be presenting training on the calculation of simple loss of income and loss of support calculations. The training is aimed at attorneys in order to equip them to give better instructions, have a better understanding of the actuarial calculation process and to aid in settlement of matters.
Same will be taking place on the following dates:
Durban 13 July 2010
Johannesburg 15 July 2010
Pretoria 15 July 2010
Cape Town 28 July 2010
Port Elizabeth 29 July 2010
KINDLY COMPLETE YOUR CONFIRMATION OF ATTENDANCE DOCUMENTS AND E-MAIL SAME TO roelf.nel@iac.co.za OR FAX TO 011 333-9663 ON/BEFORE 1 JULY 2010.
IF YOU HAVE NOT RECEIVED A CONFIRMATION OF ATTENDANCE DOCUMENT PLEASE E-MAIL ME AND I WILL FORWARD ONE TO YOU.
FIKILE MANYEU MNISI v THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND – 37233/2009 [UNREPORTED] – JUDGEMENT 18 MAY 2010
This is a dependants’ action in which the plaintiff claimed damages in her personal capacity (R726 792) and on behalf of her minor children, B M (born 1997) (R158 120) and C L M (born 2005) (R265 001)
This judgment is not concerned with any issues raised in the trial but with the manner in which the plaintiff’s attorney purported to charge fees for his services.
On Wednesday 28 April 2010 counsel for the parties attended the chambers of the Honorable Southwood J to inform that they were attempting to settle the matter and requested that the matter stand down.
The matter was adjourned and counsel later that day again approached Southwood J in chambers with a handwritten draft order. The draft recorded that the defendant would pay the plaintiff the sum of R844 686 and costs.
At that stage Southwood J was unaware that the plaintiff and her attorney had entered into a contingency fees agreement as the prescribed affidavits i.t.o. s 4 of the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 (‘the Act’) had not been filed.
After perusing the draft Southwood J informed counsel that in the absence of a breakdown of the amounts to be paid to the plaintiff and her children and proper arrangements for the administration of the funds to be paid to the children he was not prepared to make the draft order an order of court.
The parties were informed to consider these matters overnight. The next day counsel, but no attorneys, presented themselves in chambers with a typed draft order. It read as follows:
“By agreement between the parties: It is hereby ordered that:
1. …
2. …
3. The Defendant shall pay 25 % plus VAT of the total amount to the plaintiff’s attorneys in terms of the Contingency Fee Agreement Act.”
This was the first time that Southwood J became aware of a contingency fees agreement. Southwood J was not prepared to make the draft an order of court as he was not satisfied that he could order that the defendant pay 25 % plus VAT on the total amount to the plaintiff’s attorney pursuant to the terms of a contingency fee agreement and the prescribed affidavits had not been filed.
Southwood J demanded to see the contingency fees agreement as well as the plaintiff’s attorney together with counsel and the defendant’s attorney at 14h00 on 29 April 2010.
At 14h00 the counsel and the attorneys arrived at chambers. The plaintiff’s attorney’s colleague handed the contingency fees agreement apparently signed by the plaintiff to Southwood J. The plaintiff’s attorneys had arranged for his colleague to ‘stand in for him’.
The colleague was clearly unaware of the necessity for filing affidavits in accordance with s 4 of the Act. The colleague knew about the contingency fees agreement and informed as claimed he was present when it was explained to the plaintiff and when it was signed by her.
When requested by Southwood J to estimate the firm’s usual or ordinary fees for handling the case the colleague refused to do so and simply replied that ‘he stuck with’ the 25 % of the amount awarded as stated in the agreement
Southwood J was not satisfied with the contingency fees agreement and directed that the matter be adjourned to Monday 3 May 2010 so that the plaintiff’s attorney could file the affidavits required by s 4 of the Act and deal with the other problems referred to.
’In Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-op Ltd 2004 (6) SA 66 (SCA) in para 41 the court considered the Act in the following terms –
‘The Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 … provides for two forms of contingency fee agreements which attorneys and advocates may enter into with their clients. The first, is a “no win, no fees” agreement (s 2(1)(a)) and the second is an agreement in terms of which the legal practitioner is entitled to fees higher than the normal fee if the client is successful (s 2(1)(b)). The second type of agreement is subject to limitations. Higher fees may not exceed the normal fees of the legal practitioner by more than a 100 % and in the case of claim sounding in money this fee may not exceed 25 % of the total amount awarded or any amount obtained by the client in consequence of the proceedings, excluding costs (s 2(2)).
The contingency agreement in question provides that the plaintiff will pay the following to the attorney for the conduct of the case:
(1) 25 % (excluding VAT or other tax) of the capital amount awarded to the plaintiff and her dependants as a success fee; and
(2) for all work done before receipt of the capital proceeds, R1 000 per hour (excluding VAT or other tax); and
(3) any party and party cost contribution made to the plaintiff’s attorney (in respect of which the attorney need not account to the plaintiff).
This is clearly not covered by the Act and the agreement appears to be illegal. A contingency fees agreement may make provision for only double the attorney’s usual fee at the most.
On 3 May 2010 the plaintiff’s attorney appeared at court and provided the court with his affidavit and an affidavit by the plaintiff i.t.o. the Contingency Fees Act.
He informed the court that he did not and does not use the form prescribed by s 3(1)(a) of the Act for contingency fees agreements. He did not offer an explanation for not doing so.
He further informed that he enters into contingency fees agreements with his clients and, depending on the risk, he stipulates for between 15 % and 25 % of the award as his fee.
In this case he did not provide the Law Society with a copy of the contingency fees agreement. He did not offer an explanation for this.
He contended that he did not file the affidavits required by s 4 of the Act because the settlement happened so quickly.
Regarding the contingency fees agreement the plaintiff’s attorneys counsel submitted that it is covered by the provisions of the Act and is therefore valid and binding. With reference to Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) he submits that the plaintiff and Mr. Mhlanga should be allowed to contract as they see fit and that unless there is a complaint by the plaintiff that she entered into the contingency fees agreement without having fully comprehended its financial implications the agreement should not be impugned.
Despite Southwood J’s prima facie view that the contingency fees agreement offends against the Act and is not valid he declined to make an order declaring that it is invalid.
The court held:
“ I The defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff …
II …
III …
IV …
V The plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. P.T. Mhlanga, is to bear the further costs relating to the hearings on 3 May 2010 and 18 May 2010;
VI The registrar is requested and directed to send a copy of this judgment together with exhibits ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ and the affidavits filed to the President of the Law Society of the Northern Provinces to investigate the conduct of the attorney, Mr. P.T. Mhlanga, as set out in paragraph [11] at para 3(a)-(d) of this judgment; whether the contingency fees agreement between the plaintiff and Mr. Mhlanga does not comply with Act 66 of 1997 and is therefore invalid and whether the contingency fees agreements which Mr. Mhlanga has entered into with his clients generally do not comply with Act 66 of 1997.”
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax : 086 616 8308
Now for some fun –
A physician, an engineer, and an attorney were discussing who among them belonged to the oldest of the three professions represented. The physician said, “Remember, on the sixth day God took a rib from Adam and fashioned Eve, making him the first surgeon. Therefore, medicine is the oldest profession.”
The engineer replied, “But, before that, God created the heavens and earth from chaos and confusion, and thus he was the first engineer. Therefore, engineering is an older profession than medicine.”
Then, the lawyer spoke up. “Yes,” he said, “But who do you think created all of the chaos and confusion?”
Depression as Sequlae of – Quantum of damages to be awarded
Training
I am excited to announce that IAC will again be presenting training on the calculation of simple loss of income and loss of support
calculations. The training is aimed at attorneys in order to equip them to give better instructions, have a better understanding of the actuarial calculation process and to aid in settlement of matters.
Same will be taking place on the following dates:
Durban 13 July 2010
Johannesburg 15 July 2010
Pretoria 15 July 2010
Cape Town 28 July 2010
Port Elizabeth 29 July 2010
Further details will follow.
VAN DER MESCHT v THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND – 12182/2008 [UNREPORTED] – JUDGEMENT 12 MARCH 2010
The plaintiff claimed damages from the defendant arising from bodily injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle collision on 8 January 2005. The plaintiff was a cyclist on the Kliprivier Road when the insured vehicle, travelling in the same direction, collided with her from the rear. The collision caused her to fall from the bicycle and she sustained a head injury as well as orthopaedic injuries.
Both the merits and certain heads of quantum were in dispute. The Court found in favor of the plaintiff in regards to the merits.
The plaintiff’s past hospital and medical expenses as well as future medical expenses was settled. The court had to assess the plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity and general damages. It was common cause that the plaintiff suffered a head injury. What remained to be considered were the psychological sequelae of the brain injury. The plaintiff’s psychiatrist testified that the head injury had resulted in a post-traumatic neuropsychological disorder, as well as depression.
The crucial issue in quantifying the plaintiff’s damages for loss of income was to consider the effects of the psychological deficits on her employability and therefore earning capacity. Pre-morbid she excelled in the workplace and moreover fostered excellent relationships. Outside the workplace she proved her organisational capabilities in organising her own cycling events attracting some 2500 participants.
Post-collision the plaintiff remained in the employ of her employer but her capabilities dwindled resulting from her neuropsychological profile. Briefly stated, she lacked motivation and drive and often became emotional and irritable, resulting in a decline in performance and resultant loss of income to her employer.
It was common cause that depression manifested itself once prior to the collision. In addition a family history of depression had been identified. However, since the collision she often suffered from bouts of depression. In this regard the plaintiff’s psychiatrist testified that the plaintiff, prior to the collision, was pre-disposed to developing depression which could be treated and, in any event, did not cause any level of dysfunction. In contradistinction hereto, the depression the plaintiff now suffers is as a result of organic injury to the brain cells.
The depression the plaintiff now has to endure affects her coping and adaptation skills. The depression can be treated but not cured and she will therefore function at a lower level. In addition the plaintiff also suffers from cognitive deficits post-morbid.
A comparison by the plaintiff’s Industrial Psychologist between the plaintiff’s performance and that of her rival co-employee revealed that Pre-collision, the plaintiff out-performed her rival but postcollision the plaintiff brought in less than half the business her rival did.
As a result two possibilities was advanced by the plaintiff’s Industrial Psychologists: either that she remains employed at her present place of employment earning substantially less or employment in a less stressful and demanding work environment in a secretarial environment.
The defendant’s Industrial Psychologist’s opposing view was disregarded by the court. Plaintiff suggested a contingency allowance of 10% pre-morbid, and 20% post-morbid. The defendant contended for a contingency allowance of 50%.
The Honourable Judge held that a contingency deduction of 15% on the pre-morbid scenario is appropriate taking into account plaintiff’s age of 46 years, her consistent and stable employment history in public relations/marketing, the absence of any indications that she would not have further excelled in her work environment and the positive attitude she had displayed towards her work prior to the accident.
The Honourable Judge further held that a contingency deduction of 10% on the post-morbid scenario is appropriate taking into account the plaintiff’s current employer although aware of her condition since 2005, has kept her on and increased her salary from time to time; the plaintiff has no formal qualification; the plaintiff’s husband’s evidence that she was steadily improving and the negative effects a lower category employment is likely to have on her mood and therefore functioning.
Referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in De Jongh v Du Pisani NO [2004] All SA 565 (SCA) the Honourable Judge further held that the sum of R400 000 would constitute fair and adequate compensation in respect of the plaintiff’s general damages.
The plaintiff was awarded R3 333 068.00 for future loss of income and general damages of R 400 000.00 as well as Costs.
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax : 086 616 8308
With the trial season heating up here are a few wise words to keep you humble and your anger in check –
“A man wrapped up in him self makes a very small package.” – unknown
“Be not angry that you cannot make others as you wish them to be, since you cannot make
yourself as you wish to be.” – Thomas A` Kempis
Interim payment I.T.O Rule 34A of the Uniform rules of court
Dear Reader,
Welcome to the ninth edition of Independent Actuarial Consultant’s (IAC) monthly newsletter.
Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle
accidents and the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims.
We will also keep you updated of IAC developments, events and training seminars and
lighten up your day with a joke or inspirational quote.
ANNOUNCEMENT
Please take note of our new fax number 086 616 8308.
As you might have heard the Acting Judge Fabricus dismissed the application by the LSSA,SAAPIL and others on 31 March 2010. The Applicants will be appealing directly to the Constitutional Court.
HARMSE v THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND – 63149/09 [UNREPORTED] – JUDGEMENT 24 FEBRUARY 2010
The applicant approached the court on an urgent basis, for interim payment in terms of rule 34A of the Uniform Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the application.
Initially this application was brought as a normal motion, and was set down for 24 November 2009. On the said occasion, the matter was postponed sine die, and the respondent was ordered to pay the wasted costs.
Subsequent thereto, on 17 December 2009, the applicant launched an urgent application, wherein the applicant claimed interim payment from the respondent in an amount of R25 000. 00, as well as a monthly payment of R2 500. 00 from 1 January 2010 until the main action is determined.
Rule 34A of the Uniform Rules provides:
“(1) In an action for damages for personal Injuries or the death of a person, the plaintiff may, at any time after the expiry of the period for the delivery of the notice of intention to defend, apply to the court for an order requiring the defendant to make an interim payment in respect of his claim for medical costs and loss of income arising from his physical disability or the death of a person.
(4) If at the hearing of such an application, the court is satisfied that the defendant against whom the order is sought has in writing admitted liability for the plaintiff’s damages; or
the plaintiff has obtained judgment against the defendant for damages to be determined,
the court may if it thinks fit but subject to the provisions of sub-rule (5), order the defendant to make an interim payment of suchamount shall not exceed a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the court are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff taking into account any contributory negligence, set off or counterclaim.”
From the above, it is clear that a jurisdictional requirement for an interim payment, is an admission of liability in writing by the respondent. The question arises if in the present case there was such an admission.
The applicant relied on a series of settlement negotiations, which culminated in the respondent making a written offer of settlement on a 50% merits apportionment, to prove such an admission. The pinnacle of the applicant’s case in this regard, is an e-mail transmitted on 4 September 2009 by the respondent’s claims handler, Mr. Kenneth Mkhawane which reads:
“The offer for 50% merits apportionment and pre-settlement undertaking has been approved. Upon receipt of your merits acceptance, we will sent the undertaking limited to 50% via post to yourselves.”
On 7 September 2009, the application’s attorney responded to the 50% apportionment offer as follows:
“As per the meeting I confirm that I am not happy with the 50% merits offer apportionment. I have pointed out numerous aspects indicating that the insured driver’s version is not probable.”
The same date, 7 September 2009, a senior claims handler of the respondent, replied to the above email as follows: ” ….I(f) you say that the insured driver’s version is improbable , the same argument can be applied to your client’s version. I will immediately proceed to consider the appointment of a reconstruction expert and assessor to investigate further, which is the procedure to follow when one is faced with contradictory versions.”
On 3 December 2009, at the request of the respondent’s attorney, the applicant’s settlement proposals were reduced to writing and transmitted to respondent’s attorney.
On 9 December 2009, the respondent’s attorney transmitted an e-mail to the applicant’s attorney, with
the following content:
“I have managed to speak to Adv. Bezuidenhout… He informed that we cannot settle the merits for one part of the matter only. If the plaintiff cannot accept the merits in totality we unfortunately cannot assist you in this matter”
From the correspondence three aspects emerge.
First, that the parties were clearly engaged in genuine “without prejudice” negotiations. Therefore those
communications are privileged.
Secondly, there is no consensus on the liability of the respondent for the applicant’s damages. This is confirmed by the respondent’s statement that it considered appointing an accident reconstruction expert to investigate the merits.
Thirdly, even assuming that the respondent, by its offer of a 50% apportionment, had “admitted” liability for the applicant’s damages, the said “admission” was rejected by the applicant’s attorney in the e-mail of 7 September 2009.
The learned Judge found that by rejecting the respondent’s “admission” of liability, while simultaneously seeking to base his rule 34A application on the very same rejected “admission.” The applicant is failing to make an election between the two positions.
The applicant contended that it was competent for the applicant, solely for the purpose of rule 34A interim payment, to rely on the “admitted” 50% apportionment, and claim interim payment thereon, while still at large to negotiate further on the liability and apportionment percentages, in the main action. The learned Judge did not agree with this contention as the provisions of rule 34A (4) are clear, and couched in peremptory terms: only in instances where the respondent had admitted liability for the applicant’s damages, may a court order interim payment. It clearly does not envisage a situation where, the parties being in the process of settlement negotiations, one party latches onto an offer, and seek to enforce it in terms of the rule.
If sustained, the applicant’s argument could have the effect that, once an offer is made in settlement negotiations, in these types of claims, the applicant would be entitled to an interim payment. It is common knowledge that in practice, the respondent, on a daily basis, makes offers in an attempt to settle claims. If the contents of such offers are to be used against the respondent for interim payment, it would most certainly result in the respondent been discouraged to enter into any settlement proposals at all. That would defeat the whole purpose and spirit of “without prejudice” negotiations and offers, as provided in terms of rule 34A.
The application was dismissed costs to be paid by the applicant.
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax : 086 616 8308
And now for some fun –
“A lawyer died and arrived at the pearly gates. To his dismay, there were thousands of people ahead of
him in line to see St. Peter. But, to his surprise, St. Peter left his desk at the gate and came down the
long line to where the lawyer was, and greeted him warmly. Then St. Peter and one of his assistants
took the lawyer by the hands and guided him up to the front of the line, and into a comfortable chair by
his desk. The lawyer said, “I don’t mind all this attention, but what makes me so special?” St. Peter
replied, “Well, I’ve added up all the hours for which you billed your clients, and by my calculation you
must be about 193 years old!”
When does a physical disability reduce earning capacity?
PRINSLOO v THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND – CA 139/2009 (EC) – DELIVERED 26 FEBRUARY 2010
On 11 August 2005 the appellant, an inspector in the South African Police Services, sustained bodily injuries in the course of a collision between two motor vehicles. The driver of the other vehicle was entirely to blame. The appellant claimed damages for past and future medical expenses, compensation for loss of earning capacity in the future, and general damages.
The matter was set down for trial on 4 November 2008. After hearing evidence the learned judge made an award of R120 000-00 for general damages but held that the appellant had not discharged the onus of proving that her disability gave rise to reduced earning capacity, and he dismissed her claim for compensation under that head.
The appellant now appeals to this Court. It is apparent from the judgment a quo that the appellant’s injuries gave rise to permanent disability which justified a substantial award for general damages. Her case was that the same disability gives rise to a claim for future loss of income. She was a member of the South African Police Services when she sustained her injuries. She held the rank of inspector. On the facts, she suffered soft tissue injuries to the lumbar spine, which have resulted in permanent disability and impairment to perform many physical activities that are part of her work.
The correctness of the actuarial calculations was admitted. The appellant sought to discharge the onus of proving the factual allegations giving rise to the claim for a reduction of earning capacity primarily on the expert opinion of the industrial psychologist, Dr Holmes, read in the light of an agreement between the medical experts to which I shall later refer.
It was Dr Holmes’s opinion that but for the injuries and the ensuing disability the appellant would have been promoted to the rank of captain and superintendent, that she will not be able to accommodate to the restrictions of the sedentary employment to which she must be confined in the future, and that this will inevitably result in emotional trauma, frustration and stagnation in the workplace, and an inability to proceed beyond the rank of inspector. The combined effect of this will probably ultimately compel her to take early retirement.
The agreement between the medical experts, Dr Keeley, the neuro-surgeon, who was to be called by the appellant, and Dr De Jonge, the orthopaedic surgeon who was to be called by the Fund stated:
“. . . that the appellant would work until normal retirement age with the provision that she is promoted
to only office work, accommodated in an ergonomically friendly environment and never is required to
attend physical courses or training sessions; . .”
This eliminated the issue of retirement prior to the normal retirement of 60 years as the basis of thereduction of earning capacity, by reason, at any rate, of the physical disability.
Mr Pretorius argued for the appellant that the court should have accepted Dr Holmes’s opinion that the appellant will in fact retire early despite the medical agreement. The Court held that there is no doubt that her disability impairs the continued performance of these physically demanding duties.
Mr Pretorius argued that the appellant’s condition constitutes an impairment of her capacity to earn an income – she can no longer do what she does best (the physical attributes of her employment) – and that this in turn must result in the production of a lesser income in the future.
The learned judge found that on the evidence the appellant had failed to prove that her injury had a cognizable effect on her earning capacity, and, in that event, her damage was indeed nil.
The fallacy in Mr Pretorius’s criticism is that it assumes that the appellant suffers loss once he proves that his physical disabilities bring about a reduction in his earning capacity; thereafter all that remains is to quantify the loss. This assumption cannot be made. A physical disability which impacts upon capacity to earn does not necessarily reduce the estate or patrimony of the person injured. It may in some cases follow quite readily that it does, but not on the facts of this case. There must be proof that the reduction in earning capacity indeed gives rise to pecuniary loss.
In essence, the learned trial judge found that although the appellant had proved that she had suffered injuries which physically impaired her ability to perform certain kinds of police work and which prevented further advancement in the police force in those lines of work, she had not proved that she was unable to continue in her employment in the police force in other lines of work, or that she had been deprived of promotional prospects which she would in fact otherwise have had. He held in effect that on the acceptable evidence the appellant would probably not have been promoted above the rank of inspector even if she had not been injured; that she will probably continue in her employment in the police force until normal retirement age without any reduction in salary; and that she has therefore not shown that she has suffered loss.
In the light of the agreement between the doctors, the trial judge’s conclusion that the appellant did not discharge the onus of proving that she suffered a loss or reduction of her earning capacity must remain undisturbed.
In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000Independent Actuarial Consultants (Pty) Ltd. Page 3
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And for some inspiration –
“The true measure of a man is how he treats someone who can do him absolutely no good.”
– Ann Landers
The appropriate scale of costs to be awarded to counsel in the Magistrate’s court
Dear Reader,
Welcome to the seventh edition of Independent Actuarial Consultant’s (IAC) monthly newsletter. Via
this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents
and the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims.
We will also keep you updated of IAC developments, events and training seminars and lighten up your
day with a joke or inspirational quote.
ANNOUNCEMENT
Please take note of our new fax to e-mail number 086 616 8308.
BRAND v THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND (CA 170/09) [2009] ZAECGHC 85 – UNREPORTED
This is an appeal against a cost order granted by a Magistrate in a trial action. On 4 February 2005 the appellant – plaintiff in the court a quo – sustained bodily injuries in a motor collision. The appellant had abandoned a portion thereof to bring it within the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court.
The matter was set down for trial on 8 August 2008 on both merits and quantum. The appellant’s attorney, however, pursued an application for a separation of the issues and the application was granted. The magistrate’s judgment did not, however, deal with the question of costs. Immediately thereafter an 80/20 settlement in favor of the plaintiff was reached and the costs of the day would be
reserved for determination by the trial court adjudicating the issue of quantum.
The matter was set down again for hearing on 6 February 2009. On that day, and prior to evidence being led, the issue of quantum was settled. General damages would be fixed at R50 000,00, an undertaking would be furnished for future medical expenses and the respondent would pay the appellant’s taxed party and party costs.
Two issues of costs were then argued by the parties before the magistrate:
(a) the liability for the costs which had been reserved on 8 August 2008;
(b) whether the fees of counsel who represented the appellant should be limited to the tariff set out in Part IV of Annexure 2 to the magistrate’s court Rules1 or whether the magistrate should allow higher fees.
After hearing argument the magistrate gave judgment granting the appellant her taxed party and party costs, but limited counsel’s fees to those stipulated in the tariff. He omitted to deal with the costs which were reserved on 8 August 2008. In his further reasons for judgment, however, the magistrate recorded an order that the “wasted costs” of 8 August 2008 be paid by the appellant.
The appellant, sought orders from this court:
(a) setting aside the magistrate’s order and substituting therefor an order allowing counsel’s fees in an amount three times the amount set out in the tariff;
(b) an order that the costs of the hearing on 8 August 2008 be paid by the respondent.
Counsel were agreed, and correctly so, that the following principles were applicable. An order for costs falls within the discretion of the trial court. An appellate tribunal will not readily interfere with the exercise by a trial court of such discretion. It will only do so where the trial court exercised its discretion, not judicially, but capriciously or upon a wrong principle or where the order is incompetent.
See eg. Cronje v Pelser 1967 (2) SA 589 (A) at 592H-593A; Merber v Merber 1948 (1) SA 446 (A) at
452-3.
In his judgment the magistrate recorded that he had been referred to two unreported decisions in this Division: Road Accident Fund v Forbes (Case No CA 197/05, 28 September 2006) and van Zyl v Road Accident Fund (Case No CA 243/07, 19 October 2008). Both decisions were given in appeals against costs orders made by a magistrate in matters of the same nature as the present.
In the first matter Jones J inter alia upheld the magistrate’s order allowing counsel’s fees at three times the amount set out on
the tariff. In the second matter Jones J set aside a magistrate’s refusal to allow counsel’s fees at a rate and ordered that the defendant pay the costs of counsel’s fees in an amount not exceeding three times the amount set out in the tariff. The magistrate, however, sought to distinguish these two decisions.
The first basis on which a distinction was drawn was that in the two earlier cases expert evidence was led on the issue of the quantum to be awarded, whereas in the present matter the quantum was settled without any evidence being led. The distinction is without merit. As recorded earlier, the settlement of the quantum was reached only on the day the matter was set down for hearing. The appellant, and her legal team, had therefore perforce to prepare themselves on the issue of quantum in order to be in a position to lead the necessary evidence.
The second basis of distinction was that in van Zyl the defendant had conceded that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, whereas in the instant matter the appellant had accepted that her contributory negligence be fixed at 20%. Again, the magistrate proceeded on a wrong principle: the appellant had achieved success in the action and to base the refusal to make an order in terms of Note (b) referred to above on the fact of the apportionment of liability was not a judicial exercise of the discretion.
Referring to the fact that the parties had reached agreement on the issues the magistrate again stated that no expert witnesses had been called; hence, there was nothing justifying the court finding that “this is a matter which warrants an advocate as such” in that it was a case which the court dealt with on a daily basis.
Suffice it is to say that the magistrate’s approach can clearly not be endorsed. The restriction of the engagement of counsel to “special cases” enjoys no foundation in the rules of the magistrate’s court nor in the practice followed in that court, and is clearly unacceptable.
With reference to the circumstance that the appellant abandoned a portion of her claim to bring it within the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court the magistrate’s further reasons contain the following paragraphs:
“Though someone may argue that the matter has been brought to district court because of expenses I strongly feel that a irregardless (sic) of that argument a High Court matter deserve to be taken to High Court otherwise we will find ourselves in a situation where a Mini High Court is created by practice in the District Court. I do not think this is the intention of our legislature.”
Suffice it to say that this reasoning is difficult to follow and that to the extent that this approach contributed to the magistrate’s coming to the conclusion reached by him, it is clear that a wrong principle was adopted. The court held that where a plaintiff is awarded an amount that falls within the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court it does not lie within the mouth of that plaintiff, in an attempt to secure an order for costs on a higher scale, to point to the fact that it was alleged that the claim was in an amount in excess of that jurisdiction, but that the claim was reduced to the limit of that jurisdiction.
The issue of the costs of the hearing on 8 August 2008 remains. The magistrate was not entitled in his further reasons to supplement the orders made in his judgment by the addition of a further order. In any event he did not motivate his finding that the costs in question were “wasted costs” nor his ruling that same should be paid by the appellant. Neither can be supported.
The appeal succeeds. The costs order issued by the magistrate is set aside and for it is substituted with the following:
“The defendant will pay the plaintiff’s taxed party and party costs, such costs to include:
1. the costs of the hearing on 6 August 2008;
2. counsel’s fees in amounts not exceeding double the amounts set out in the relevant tariff contained in Part IV of Annexure 2 to
the Rules.”
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Fax : (021) 422 4378,
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax 2 e-mail : 086 616 8308
And to lighten up your day here’s your joke –
NASA was interviewing professionals to be sent to Mars. Only one could go — and couldn’t return to Earth. The first applicant, an engineer, was asked how much he wanted to be paid for going. “A million dollars,” he answered, “because I want to donate it to M.I.T.”
The next applicant, a doctor, was asked the same question. He asked for $2 million. “I want to give a million to my family,” he explained, “and leave the other million for the advancement of medical research.”
The last applicant was a lawyer. When asked how much money he wanted, he whispered in the interviewer’s ear, “Three million dollars.” “Why so much more than the others?” asked the interviewer.
The lawyer replied, “If you give me $3 million, I’ll give you $1 million, I’ll keep $1 million, and we’ll send the engineer to Mars.”
SCA Rules that concept of joint wrongdoers not restricted to those cited in original proceedings
Dear Reader,
Welcome to the sixth edition of Independent Actuarial Consultant’s (IAC) monthly newsletter. Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents and the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims.
This week we deal with the interesting issue of joint wrongdoers in an action for damages stemming from delict.
ANNOUNCEMENT
We trust you and yours enjoyed a well deserved break. We wish you all a prosperous and successful 2010. We here at IAC are very proud of the service we offer and wish to congratulate our new appointments for slotting into the cogs of the IAC machine so smoothly.
We are in the process of adopting a brand new service charter. The aim with the service charter is to improve our service by clearly setting out our obligations and your rights thereby increasing accountability and improving our service delivery to you, our valued clients.
Same will be distributed to you, via e-mail, in due course.
Also please take note of our new fax to e-mail number 086 616 8308
ABSA BROKERS (PTY) LTD v RMB FINANCIAL SERVICES AND OTHERS 2009 (6) SA 549 (SCA)
This is an appeal against an order upholding an exception. An action was brought against the appellant by a family trust (“the trust”) for the recovery of alleged damages sustained due to negligent investment advice given by the appellant’s employees. After settling the claim, the appellant instituted action against four respondents in proceedings that are the subject of this appeal, alleging that they were joint wrongdoers and seeking to recover a contribution from them under s2(12), read with s2(6), of the Apportionment of
Damages Act 34 of 1956 (“the Act”).
The appellant pleaded that the first and second respondent had devised, designed and developed the product in which the trust had invested and had furthermore utilised the services of the third and fourth respondents to promote and market it to members of the public, including its employees. It was alleged that the respondents actions caused the appellants employee to make false or incorrect statements about the nature of the product. The respondents excepted to the appellants particulars as disclosing no cause of action, in that the appellant did not give them notice of the first action as required by s2(2) of the Act nor had it obtained leave of the court, in terms of s2(4) of the Act before proceedings had been instituted. They therefore contended that the applicant was prevented from instituting the action.
The appellant, relying on Becker v Kellerman 1971 (2) SA 172 (T), argued the meaning of the phrase “where it is alleged” in s2(1) of the Act. The Appeal therefore turned on the interpretation of s2(1), s2(2) and s2(4) of the Act.
I quote the relevant sections hereafter:
“(1) Where it is alleged that two or more persons are jointly and or severally liable in delict to a third person (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff) for the same damage, such persons (hereinafter referred to as joint wrongdoers) may be sued in the same action.” (my own emphasize)
“(2) Notice of any action may at any time before the close of pleadings in that action be given –
(a) by the plaintiff;
(b) by any joint wrongdoer who is sued in that action, to any joint wrongdoer who is not sued in that action, and such joint wrongdoer may thereupon intervene as a defendant in that action.”
“(4) If a joint wrongdoer is not sued in an action instituted against another joint wrongdoer and no notice is given to him in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection (2), the plaintiff shall not thereafter sue him except with the leave of the court on good cause shown as to why notice was not given as aforesaid”
The appellant contended that the phrase meant it was not obliged to give the respondents notice of the trusts action, nor to have the leave of court, since it had not been alleged in the trust’s action that the respondents were joint wrongdoers.
In Becker v Kellerman the Court held that the phrase “where it is alleged” in s2(1) had to be interpreted as “where it is alleged in an action”, so that the phrase “joint wrongdoers”, as contemplated by the relevant subsections, applied only to persons who had been alleged to be joint wrongdoers in the initial action. In the absence of such an allegation in the initial action, the person who was subsequently sued was not a “joint wrongdoer” and did not fall within the terms of s 2(4)(a) The Court held that the construction of the aforesaid phrase in Becker v Kellerman was inconsistent with the scheme of the Act. The phrase did not mean joint wrongdoers meant
only people who had been alleged at some point to be joint wrongdoers. Becker v Kellerman overruled.
The Court further held that it therefore followed that in the absence of notification to the respondents of the earlier action, as required by s2(2), and without the leave of the Court, s2(4)(b) prevented the appelant from instituting the present action. Appeal dismissed.
Appellant granted leave to amend its particulars of claim.
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Fax : (021) 422 4378,
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax 2 e-mail : 086 616 8308
And to start of the year I thought I will lay off the lawyer jokes and take a stab at counsel –
“What do you call a smiling, sober, courteous person at a bar association convention?
The caterer.”
Application of the Maxim “RES IPSA LOQUITOR” in MVA claims
Dear Reader,
Welcome to the fifth edition of Independent Actuarial Consultant’s (IAC) monthly newsletter. Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents and the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims. We will also keep you updated of IAC developments, events and training seminars and lighten up your day with a joke or inspirational quote.
ANNOUNCEMENT
Thanks to you, our valued clients, IAC’s MVA department has experienced it most successful month ever. In acknowledging your great support and in an effort to improve our service to you even further we have appointed three new members off staff who will be dealing with the loss of income and loss of support calculations, they are:
- Danai Ru’nanga- BComm. (Hons) Actuarial Science
- Maureen Kumwenda- BSc. (Mathematics and Statistics) currently doing honours in BSc. (Computational Finance)
- Siyanda Ngquba- BSc. (Mathematics and Statistics) currently doing honours in BSc. (Computational Finance).
We also wish to inform you that Mr Johan Olivier, the head of our MVA department, has decided to bid IAC farewell after seven years of dedicated service. We wish Johan well with his future endeavors. We are proud to announce that due to the depth of actuarial professionals at IAC we were able to fill the position from within our own ranks. Mr Wim Loots will be taking over as head of the MVA department from 2 November 2009.
Wim has been with IAC since 2005. He has intimate knowledge of IAC’s clients, processes and people and brings with him a wealth of experience. Wim obtained his B.Sc. in Actuarial science cum laude in 1993 from the then Rand Afrikaans
University (RAU). He is a fellow of the institute of actuaries in England and a fellow of the actuarial society of South-Africa. Wim we wish you Danai, Maureen and Siyanda well and look forward to working with you. These are exciting times full of promise and we are proud to share them with you our valued clients.
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v MEHLOMAKULU 2009 (5) SA 390
This is an appeal against a declaratory order that the RAF (the fund) is liable to compensate the respondent (plaintiff a quo) for serious bodily injuries sustained in a collision on 26 April 2003. I will refer to the appellant as the fund and the respondents as the plaintiff. The facts were that two insured vehicles collided with each other on a curve on the national road at night time without lights (first collision) and, as the plaintiff’s vehicle entered the curve, it collided with the stationary insured vehicles (second collision). The drivers of the insured vehicles died on the scene. The particulars alleged that the drivers of the insured vehicles were negligent in: (1) causing the
first collision, and the second collision was a direct consequence of the first collision; alternatively, (2) causing their vehicles to be and remain, a hazardous and unlighted obstruction on the roadway. The court a quo invoked the res ipsa loquitor maxim and found the drivers of the insured vehicles had been negligent in causing the first collision.
For the sake of clarity the learned Jones J included the following extracts from W E Cooper’s Motor Law vol 2 “Principles of Liability” (Juta, 1987) which I repeat: ‘It is said res ipsa loquitor when: “… human experience shows us that in certain circumstances it is most improbable that the occurrence under investigation would have taken place without negligence.” ’ Mr Cole who appeared for the plaintiff in the trial and subsequent appeal based his argument on the fact that two vehicles collided on a wide, tarred national road in circumstances where the road surface was good and the weather fair, which gives rise to the inference that one of them must have deviated from its path of travel into that of the other. He also submitted that generally a roadworthy vehicle under the control of a skillful driver will behave in a manner consonant with the basic traffic rules (Macleod v Rens 1997 (3) SA 1039 (E) ). His suggested conclusion was that the occurrence of the first collision was such that res ipsa loquitor.
The court held that Mr Cole makes the mistake of seeking to infer negligence by reason of the maxim from an occurrence which’s nature does not make a conclusion of negligence inevitable. Following Mr Cole’s reasoning a claimant in a damages claim following any road accident would be able to rely on evidence of a collision without more for an inference of negligence in his favour, making the maxim of general application to road accident cases, and a nonsense of the rule that the onus is on the claimant to prove his case. The court rejected the conclusion. As to the second averment, namely that they caused their vehicles to be and remain, a hazardous and unlighted obstruction on the roadway, these averments makes out a case based squarely on the presence of a dangerous hazard in the road. The plaintiff proved that case. His evidence established that as he drove round the bend he was suddenly confronted with an unlighted vehicle in his path making it impossible to avoid a collision. In the court’s opinion this was clearly an occurrence of which can be said res ipsa loquitor. The evidence of the occurrence raises a prima facie inference of negligence on the part of the person in control of the stationary vehicle with which he collided.
According to the court it is then up to the fund to explain how the obstruction got there, what was it doing there and why it was still there when he arrived. If no explanation is given then it compels an inference of negligence. The court held, on the alternative, that a prima facie inference of negligence arose res ipsa loquitor, (a) from causing such an obstacle to be in the middle of the road at night, and (b) from allowing it to remain there. There was nothing at all before the court to displace the inference of negligence from (a), and insufficient information to displace the inference from (b).
Appeal dismissed.
Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Fax : (021) 422 4378,
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
And I leave you with a bit of inspiration for this, the last push towards the end of the year –
“Always bear in mind that your own resolution to succeed is more important than any
one thing” – Abraham Lincoln
RAF 
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