Tag Archive | Compensation

Big Quantum Does Not = Senior Counsel – IAC Newsletter 39/2014, (March 2014)

RAC image

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the 39th edition of Independent Actuaries & Consultant’s (IAC’s) MVA newsletter.

Big Quantum does not = Senior Counsel – Smit v RAF, Eastern Cape High Court (PE), case no: 448/2013

Both the merits of the plaintiff’s claim and the quantum of his damages had been agreed between the parties. The court ordered that the defendant pay the plaintiff the sum of R3,050,612-16 (Three Million Fifty Thousand Six Hundred and Twelve Rand and Sixteen Cents) in full and final settlement of his damages.

The parties were unable to reach agreement in respect of the costs order to be made. The defendant tendered the plaintiff’s costs including the qualifying expenses of expert witnesses on a party and party scale. The plaintiff seeked an order that the defendant pay the costs of two counsel. This was the only issue in dispute.

Summons was originally issued in February 2013 claiming the amount of R6 082 652.00 and the Particulars of Claim were prepared and signed by junior counsel. A subsequent amendment inflated the figures, notably those in respect of loss of earning capacity and general damages, so as to claim the amount of R8 144 578.52.

On 1 October 2013 the plaintiff’s attorney of record instructed a second counsel to lead the junior counsel who had drafted the pleadings and to conduct the trial.

The bulk of the claim related to loss of earning capacity and general damages.

The court noted that generally, the computation and proof of a claim for loss of earning capacity does usually involve complex issues of fact and law. Where the claim is large, then it is usually a reasonable and prudent precaution for a plaintiff to engage the services of two counsel.

The accident in the present case, however, occurred on 8 October 2008 after the amendment act came into force that has the effect of “capping” loss of income claims.

The plaintiff’s claim in respect of his actual loss of earning capacity amounted to R7 025 477,00 as calculated by an actuary. His loss of earning capacity computed and capped in accordance with section 17(4)(c) of the Act as calculated by the same actuary, amounted to R2 583 000,00.

The court held that where it is a foregone conclusion that the plaintiff’s actual loss of earning capacity will far exceed the limit set by section17 of the Act, the calculation and proof of the plaintiff’s entitlement will not involve any significant factual or legal difficulty.

The court further held that the assessment of general damages is dependent primarily on the lay evidence of the plaintiff himself and, though not entirely simple, was not so complex as to justify the employment of two counsel.

In the courts view one counsel of sufficient seniority and experience could have properly handled the matter without any significant difficulty.

Now for some inspiration  –

“That old law about ‘an eye for an  eye’ leaves everybody blind. The time is always right to do the right thing.”

Martin Luther King Jr.

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Passenger Claims – Will you be able to transfer same from the Mag Court to the High Court

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the twenty second edition of Independent Actuaries & Consultant’s (IAC’s) monthly newsletter.

WE PROVIDE LOSS OF INCOME AND LOSS OF SUPPORT CALCULATIONS TO ATTORNEYS DEALING WITH MVA & OTHER DAMAGES CLAIMS.
WE ALSO PROVIDE FREE TRAINING SEMINARS ON THE RAF AMENDMENT ACT TO ALL OUR VALUED CLIENTS.

If you send us instructions you are entitled to the same.

Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents, the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims and dates and venues of training seminars.

In this Newsletter:

This was an appeal against a judgment of the North Gauteng High Court dismissing the appellant’s application to have his civil case transferred from the Pretoria magistrates’ court to the North Gauteng High Court.

The appellant sustained serious bodily injuries as a result of a motor collision which took place on 1 March 2003. In March 2004 the appellant issued summons against the respondent in the Pretoria Magistrates’ Court. During December 2004 the appellant’s attorney discovered that the quantum of the appellant’s claim exceeded the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court but persisted with his claim in the Magistrates Court. On 25 June 2008, the appellant’s attorney wrote a letter to the Fund advising it that further medical reports revealed that the appellant’s claim exceeded the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court and requested a consent to a transfer of the case to the high court. There was no reply and the appellant launched an application in the North Gauteng High Court for the transfer of the case to that court.

The Fund opposed the application on various grounds and the high court found in favour of the Fund. The question on appeal is whether the court below was correct in its reasoning and conclusion. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that a failure to order a transfer of the action from the magistrates’ court to the high court would result in grave injustice to the appellant and that this would be against constitutional norms. The injustice flowed from the fact that although the appellant had a substantive right to claim damages from the Fund the appellant is precluded from pursuing it in the high court because of the statutory oversight to cater for a transfer from the magistrates’
court at a plaintiff’s instance.

The inherent jurisdiction of the high court is entrenched in s 173 of the Constitution. Section 173 does not give any of the high courts carte blanche to interfere in the affairs of inferior courts. A high court can only exercise its inherent jurisdiction in relation to the regulation of its own process when confronted with a case over which it already has jurisdiction (my italics) and when faced with procedures and rules of the court which do not provide a mechanism to deal with an instant problem. As far as the appellant’s submission that the ‘interests of justice’ required the high court to use its inherent jurisdiction to order a transfer of the case to the high court is concerned the court found that the appellant’s access to court was not impeded by some lacuna in the law (my italics). His attorneys chose the wrong forum and persisted therein when it was clear on the available evidence that a change of forum was imperative to protect his interests.

Furthermore the appellant is not without remedy (my italics). He has a right to institute a claim for compensation against his attorneys for the difference between what might be recovered through the magistrates’ court and the full extent of his loss A high court may not use its inherent jurisdiction to create a right (my italics). The appellant had a right to institute action in the appropriate forum to the full extent of his claim. Prescription has extinguished part of his claim. The court held that if there is a case in which it is necessary to fashion a
constitutionally acceptable remedy because of the interests of justice, this is not it. The appeal was dismissed with costs Should Parliament fail to amend the specific provisions dealing with passenger claims before 16 August 2012 (as per Mvumvu judgement – refer May 2011 newsletter), and the claim becomes “unlimited” or if they get their act together and a different compensation regime is enacted for passenger claims, claimants who issued summons in the Mag court might be faced with a situation where they will in any event not benefit. Based on Oosthuizen there are two factors weighing against a claimant successfully transferring his claim where he has issued summons in the Mag court and prescription has taken place namely, “the high court can only exercise its inherent jurisdiction … when confronted with a case over which it already has jurisdiction” and “A high court may not use its inherent jurisdiction to create a right.” especially if prescription has extinguished part of a claim.

However, such a scenario would not be based on any fault or oversight on the part of the claimant or his attorney but it would be a case of “the appellant’s access to court being impeded by some lacuna in the law” and “Furthermore the appellant is … without remedy.” These two factors might convince the court that “it is a case in which it is necessary to fashion a constitutionally acceptable remedy because of the interests of justice”. Interesting times lies ahead.

Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:

• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax : 086 616 8308

Now for some words of wisdom –
“Treasures of wickedness profit nothing, but righteousness delivers from death” – Proverbs
10:2 (AMP)

Serious Injuries – The interrelationship between the AMA and Narrative tests

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the twenty first edition of Independent Actuaries and Consultant’s (IAC’s) monthly newsletter.

WE PROVIDE LOSS OF INCOME AND LOSS OF SUPPORT CALCULATIONS TO ATTORNEYS DEALING WITH MVA & OTHER DAMAGES CLAIMS.
WE ALSO PROVIDE FREE TRAINING SEMINARS ON THE RAF AMENDMENT ACT TO ALL OUR VALUED CLIENTS.

If you send us instructions you are entitled to the same.

Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents, the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims and dates and venues of training seminars.

Today’s Newsletter

We will look at the decision made in relation to the application of the 3rd respondent in this matter, one Ntombiko Priscilla Sunduzwayo. She was injured in a motor vehicle accident on 9 April 2009. At the time, she was working at a bus terminal in Philippi, Cape Town, as a passenger-tout for long distance buses and taxis to the Eastern Cape. She was struck down by a motor vehicle while crossing a road and sustained severe injuries to her lower leg. As a result, she is unable to resume her work as a tout, an occupation which requires her to run about physically in search of potential passengers.

She contended that the consequences of her injuries on her quality of life renders it appropriate to characterise the injuries as ‘serious’ within the meaning of the proviso to s 17(1) of the Act and she proposed to claim compensation for general damages.

As she could not afford to pay the R 7 000.00 required for a serious injury assessment report she submitted a request to the Fund for financial assistance in respect of the required serious injury assessment on 4 September 2009. On 19 April 2010, after her attorney had made various follow up inquiries, the Fund refused the request for financial assistance. The Fund contended that it was liable to pay the costs of a serious injury assessment only in the event that the claimant had sustained serious injuries that resulted in not less than ‘30% permanent body impairment’. A telephonic enquiry by the applicant’s attorney obtained confirmation from the relevant functionary at the Fund who had been dealing with the matter that he had not considered the narrative test to ascertain the seriousness, or lack
thereof, of the injury. In the court papers the Fund stated that if a request for financial assistance in respect of a serious injury assessment is not sufficiently substantiated to establish a prima facie indication of a serious injury it will not fund further investigation into the seriousness of the injury or its consequences. It further stated that the so-called narrative test is there to cover those isolated and rare cases where the objective criteria of the AMA6 are not met. It is a fallback position.

The court stated that the narrative test falls to be applied as an integral part of any serious injury assessment and this is indeed confirmed by the content of part 5 of the RAF4 form, which gives effect to regulation 3(1)(b)(iii) of Road Accident Fund Regulations (2008). There is nothing in regulation 3(1)(b) which suggests that the narrative test should be applied only in ‘rare and isolated cases’. The functionary of the Fund who declined the third applicant’s request in terms of regulation 3(2)(b) gave no consideration whatsoever to the possible effect of the application of the narrative test and plainly did not consider that the narrative test fell to be applied together with AMA Guides as ‘a collective’ and not as a fallback procedure when the AMA guidelines has not been met.

The decision by the Fund to decline the third applicant’s request in terms of regulation 3(2)(b) of the Road Accident Fund Regulations (2008) was set aside.

Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:

• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax : 086 616 8308

Now for some words of wisdom –
“The blessing of the Lord makes truly rich, and He adds no sorrow with it (neither does toiling
increase it)” – Proverbs 10:22 (AMP)

Passenger Claims – The Mvumvu (CCT 67/10 ZACC 1) aftermath

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the twentieth edition of Independent Actuaries and Consultant’s (IAC’s) monthly newsletter.

WE PROVIDE LOSS OF INCOME AND LOSS OF SUPPORT CALCULATIONS TO ATTORNEYS DEALING WITH MVA & OTHER DAMAGES CLAIMS. WE ALSO PROVIDE FREE TRAINING SEMINARS ON THE RAF AMENDMENT ACT TO ALL OUR VALUED CLIENTS.

If you send us instructions you are entitled to the same.

Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle
accidents, the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims and dates and
venues of training seminars.

Passenger Claims – The Mvumvu aftermath

The facts of this matter are that Ms Mvumvu and 2 other sustained serious injuries in separate collisions, prior to 1 August 2008, whilst being conveyed as passengers. They launched an application to declare section 18 of the RAF Act (“the Act”), which places a R 25 000.00 limitation on their claims for damages, invalid. The Western Cape High Court (WCHC) declared parts of S 18 invalid as it found the limitation to be unconstitutional. However, it ordered that Ms Mvumvu and the other Applicants would qualify for no greater compensation than those who suffered bodily injury after the Amendment Act took effect.

The order was referred to the Constitutional Court (CC) for confirmation and Ms Mvumvu and the 2 others applied to the CC that the order made by the WCHC insofar as it limited their claims to that which they are entitled to recover under the Amendment Act, be set aside, as they were injured prior to the amendment act coming into effect.  The fund did not oppose the declaration of unconstitutionality of S 18 but opposed an order granting all passengers injured prior to 1 August 2008, whose claims had not finally been dealt with, being allowed to claim on an unlimited basis.  The fund cited financial reasons and the sustainability of the fund to motivate their argument not to allow the order of unconstitutionality to operate retrospectively.  The CC confirmed the order of invalidity of parts of S 18 of the Act and ruled that the matter must be remitted to Parliament for it to provide relief for the inequality which the old scheme continues to cause passengers injured prior to 1 August 2008, whose claims has not been finalized.   The invalidity order is therefore suspended for 18 months to give Parliament the opportunity to fix the problem.

If Parliament fails to cure the defect within the period stated above, which runs out on 16 August 2012, the invalidity order will come into operation with immediate effect and it will operate retrospectively to the date on which the Act came into force. What this means is that the applicants will be entitled to unlimited compensation as if the cap was never enacted. However, the declaration of invalidity ought not to apply to claims in respect of which a final settlement has been reached or a final judgment has been granted, before the date of this judgment (17 February 2011).   As a result of the CC judgement the fund has revoked their previous directive not to make any offers on claims i.t.o. S 18(1)(a)(i) (persons injured while being conveyed “for reward”), S 18(1)(b) (passengers who were conveyed under circumstances other than those referred to in section 18(1)(a)) and S 18(2) (persons who has a COIDA claim) and will once again make offers up to the maximum of R 25 000.00.
Sending us an Instruction:

Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000
• Fax : 086 616 8308

Now for some words of wisdom –
“The thing a wicked man fears shall come upon him, but the desire of the (uncompromisingly)
righteous shall be granted” – Proverbs 10:24 (AMP)

When does a physical disability reduce earning capacity?

PRINSLOO v THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND – CA 139/2009 (EC) – DELIVERED 26 FEBRUARY 2010

Broken Arm
On 11 August 2005 the appellant, an inspector in the South African Police Services, sustained bodily injuries in the course of a collision between two motor vehicles.  The driver of the other vehicle was entirely to blame. The appellant claimed damages for past and future medical expenses, compensation for loss of earning capacity in the future, and general damages.

The matter was set down for trial on 4 November 2008. After hearing evidence the learned judge made an award of R120 000-00 for general damages but held that the appellant had not discharged the onus of proving that her disability gave rise to reduced earning capacity, and he dismissed her claim for compensation under that head.

The appellant now appeals to this Court. It is apparent from the judgment a quo that the appellant’s injuries gave rise to permanent disability which justified a substantial award for general damages.  Her case was that the same disability gives rise to a claim for future loss of income. She was a member of the South African Police Services when she sustained her injuries. She held the rank of inspector. On the facts, she suffered soft tissue injuries to the lumbar spine, which have resulted in permanent disability and impairment to perform many physical activities that are part of her work.

The correctness of the actuarial calculations was admitted. The appellant sought to discharge the onus of proving the factual allegations giving rise to the claim for a reduction of earning capacity primarily on the expert opinion of the industrial psychologist, Dr Holmes, read in the light of an agreement between the medical experts to which I shall later refer.

It was Dr Holmes’s opinion that but for the injuries and the ensuing disability the appellant would have been promoted to the rank of captain and superintendent, that she will not be able to accommodate to the restrictions of the sedentary employment to which she must be confined in the future, and that this will inevitably result in emotional trauma, frustration and stagnation in the workplace, and an inability  to proceed beyond the rank of inspector.  The combined effect of this will probably ultimately compel her to take early retirement.

The agreement between the medical experts, Dr Keeley, the neuro-surgeon, who was to be called by the appellant, and Dr De Jonge, the orthopaedic surgeon who was to be called by the Fund stated:

“. . . that the appellant would work until normal retirement age with the provision that she is promoted
to only office work, accommodated in an ergonomically friendly environment and never is required to
attend physical courses or training sessions; . .”

This eliminated the issue of retirement prior to the normal retirement of 60 years as the basis of  thereduction of earning capacity, by reason, at any rate, of the physical disability.

Mr Pretorius argued for the appellant that the court should have accepted Dr Holmes’s opinion that the appellant will in fact retire early despite the medical agreement. The Court held that there is no doubt that her disability impairs the continued performance of these physically demanding duties.

Mr Pretorius argued that the appellant’s condition constitutes an impairment of her capacity to earn an income – she can no longer do what she does best (the physical attributes of her employment) – and that this in turn must result in the production of a lesser income in the future.

The learned judge found that on the evidence the appellant had failed to prove that her injury had a cognizable effect on her earning capacity, and, in that event, her damage was indeed nil.

The fallacy in Mr Pretorius’s criticism is that it assumes that the appellant suffers loss once he proves that his physical disabilities bring about a reduction in his earning capacity; thereafter all that remains is to quantify the loss. This assumption cannot be made.  A physical disability which impacts upon capacity to earn does not necessarily reduce the estate or patrimony of the person injured. It may in some cases follow quite readily that it does, but not on the facts of this case. There must be proof that the reduction in earning capacity indeed gives rise to pecuniary loss.

In essence, the learned trial judge found that although the appellant had proved that she had suffered injuries which physically impaired her ability to perform certain kinds of police work and which prevented further advancement in the police force in those lines of work, she had not proved that she was unable to continue in her employment in the police force in other lines of work, or that she had been deprived of promotional prospects which she would in fact otherwise have had. He held in effect that on the acceptable evidence the appellant would probably not have been promoted above the rank of inspector even if she had not been injured; that she will probably continue in her employment in the police force until normal retirement age without any reduction in salary; and that she has therefore not shown that she has suffered loss.

In the light of the agreement between the doctors, the trial judge’s conclusion that the appellant did not discharge the onus of proving that she suffered a loss or reduction of her earning capacity must remain undisturbed.
In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.

Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:

• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000Independent Actuarial Consultants (Pty) Ltd. Page 3
• Fax : 086 616 8308

And for some inspiration –
“The true measure of a man is how he treats someone who can do him absolutely no good.”
– Ann Landers

NPD rules on meaning of “delivered by hand” in S 24(1)(b) OF RAF ACT 56 of 1996

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the fourth edition of Independent Actuarial Consultant’s (IAC) monthly newsletter. Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents and the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims.

I would like to thank all the members of the legal community who took time from their busy schedules to join us at the various training sessions and trust that what you learnt will assist you in practice. In all we had 182 attorneys who attended the training sessions in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Cape Town.

I would especially like to thank all the attendees for their various e-mails in which they praised us for the manner of presentation and content of the training material. With such a positive reponse from our readers we will definitely keep investing in future training sessions.

CHETTY v THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND 2009 (5) SA 193

In the afternoon of the last day (28 March 2002) before the Appelant’s (plaintiff a quo) claim for compensation would have become prescribed the Appelant’s attorney attempted to deliver the claim by hand at the Respondent’s office. However, the Respondent’s office had closed at noon in accordance with its practice to do so on the day before a public holiday.

The attorney was refused access to the building by the security guards and instructed to deposit the claim in a wooden box in the foyer the Respondent used to receive documents. She did so and left. The Appelant subsequently instituted action in the magistrates court to which the Respondent raised a special plea of prescription as they contended that the claim had only been lodged on 4 April 2009. This was based on the contention that the Appelant did not comply with S 24(1)(b) of the Act which states that a claim shall “…(b) be sent by registered post or delivered by hand to the fund at its principal, branch or regional office… and the fund … shall at the time of delivery by hand acknowledge receipt thereof and the date of such receipt in writing.”

The special plea was upheld by the magistrate in the court a quo. The Appelant appealed to the Natal Provincial Division. The Appeal turned on whether depositing the claim in the box in the foyer amounted to delivery of the
claim to the Respondent on the day on which it was deposited or not. No evidence was led by the Respondent to gainsay that of the Appelant’s attorney as set out above. Accordingly the court held that what was required for delivery by hand in terms of s 24(1)(b) was that delivery takes place when a person is placed in possession of the relevant documentation. In the present matter the Appelant had to prove that depositing the claim in the wooden box amounted to the respondent being placed in possession of the claim. The court further held that the physical and mental elements of possession were present as the Respondent had physical control over the box and one of the Respondent’s claims handlers gave evidence that the Respondent regarded documents deposited into the box as having been received the
day they were placed there The Respondent had thus been placed in possession of the claim when the Appelant’s attorney
deposited the claim by hand in the box.

Appeal upheld with costs.

Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:
• Fax : (021) 422 4378,
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000

And I leave you with my parting joke for the month –
Q: What’s wrong with Lawyer jokes?
A: Lawyers don’t think they’re funny, and nobody else thinks they’re jokes.

SCA rules that dependant who died contemporaneously with breadwinner not a collateral benefit

Dear Reader,

Welcome to the second edition of Independent Actuarial Consultant’s (IAC) monthly newsletter.

Via this newsletter we will keep you updated of all the latest case law relating to motor vehicle accidents and the quantification of damages relating to personal injury claims. In keeping with our stated aim of empowering you, the reader, we are proud to announce that we will be presenting training seminars in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban and Cape Town during the recess period of 28 September 2009 to 2 October 2009.
For more information please refer to the content underneath the heading “TRAINING’ hereunder.

THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND v MONANI and another 2009 (4) SA 327

The respondents (plaintiff’s a quo) instituted action against the appellant (the Road Accident Fund) for damages for loss of support flowing from the death of the deceased in a motor vehicle accident.

At the time that he died he had a duty to support and supported his “wife”, the plaintiff’s and another child dependant (Thando) who died in the same accident. The question for adjudication by the Court a quo was whether the death of Thando in the accident constituted a collateral benefit resulting from the accident, for which the Plaintiff’s should not be compensated. The parties were agreed that should the Court find that the death of Thando was not a collateral benefit resulting from the accident, Plaintiff’s would be entitled to receive damages in a further
sum of R 163 428.00, the parties having already agreed the plaintiff’s were entitled to a sum of R 1 389 531.00.
The Court a quo held that the additional amount of R 163 482.00 was payable and gave judgment for the amount of R 1 552 959.00. The fund appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court of Appeal where counsel for the fund contended that the award to the surviving dependants had to be restricted to what they would have received had Thando not died.

During his argument he was willing to concede that if, hypothetically, Thando had died at any time before the deceased then her share would have been distributed between her mother and surviving siblings. However, he was not willing to concede that if Thando had died after the deceased the same situation would have applied save for the such maintenance as would have been appropriated for her maintenance between the date of the deceased’s death and the date on which she died. Counsel hung his hat on the contention that there appeared to be no decided cases in our law which dealt with the computation of compensation in a dependant’s claim where one or more of the dependants died simultaneously with the breadwinner. He therefore asked that the matter be considered res nova.

The court held that the defendant had correctly conceded that if Thando had died before the date of delict, the plaintiff’s would have been entitled to the extra amount of R 163 428.00, and that would also have been the position had she died at any time after the date of delict (save for any amount of maintenance that would have accrued to her between that date and date of her death). There could therefore be no basis, in logic or otherwise, for a contention that since her death occurred contemporaneously with the deceased, the amount of R 163 482.00 should be excised from the award.

Appeal dismissed.

TRAINING

Mr Johan Olivier of IAC, a qualified senior actuary and head of our MVA department, will be presenting training sessions on the computation of a simple loss of income and loss of support calculations.

The aim of the sessions are to acquaint practitioners with the basic premise of an actuarial calculation thereby empowering you to understand the effects of the various factors that play a part in the computation of loss of income and support. This will result in a better understanding of the process and also aid in the settlement of claims.

The dates for the training sessions are as follows:

  1. Johannesburg 29 September 2009
  2. Pretoria 29 September 2009
  3. Durban 30 September 2009
  4. Cape Town 1 October 2009

Further information will follow. Hope to see you all there.

Sending us an Instruction
Our dedicated full time professional team receive instructions by any of the following means:

• Fax : (021) 422 4378,
• Email : damagesclaims@iac.co.za, or
• Post : PO Box 1172, Cape Town, 8000

And I leave you with two parting jokes for the month –
“Q: What’s the difference between a lawyer and a herd of buffalo?
A: The lawyer charges more. “

Lawyer: “Let me give you my honest opinion.”
Client: “No, no. I’m paying for professional advice.”